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Abstract  
 
This paper aims to analyze the interactions between home country governments and Developing Country 
Multinational Companies (DMNCs). Drawing on evidence from the Brazilian political environment and 
Brazilian multinationals we investigate the mechanisms governments use to influence the internationalization 
process of domestic companies and firms’ political strategic responses to shape the political institutional 
environment in which they operate. We argue that foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows from developing 
economies need to be explored given specific country level contextual factors, such as high levels of government 
involvement. Our main findings support this idea and indicate that home country governments use a series of 
formal and informal mechanisms in order to drive the international expansion of DMNCs in both the entry and 
consolidation phases. Moreover, DMNCs political behavior in the home country political environment accounts 
for an important part of their strategy to develop political resources and obtain above average returns from 
governmental benefits. 
 
Key words: competitive advantage; interactions between companies and governments; developing country 
multinational companies. 
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Introduction   
 
 
This paper aims to analyze the interactions between home country governments and Developing 
Country Multinational Companies (DMNCs). Building on evidence from the Brazilian political 
environment and Brazilian multinationals, we uncover the mechanisms of government influence in the 
internationalization process of domestic companies and firms’ political strategic responses to shape 
public policy process. The research seeks to contribute to a growing body of studies oriented towards 
understanding DMNCs’ international insertion. DMNCs have been shown to have different strategic 
choices that can be explained by their context, country of origin, industry and size (Ramamurti, 2012). 
We intent to explore how the political component embedded in international business activity has an 
influence in such choices and impacts DMNC entrance in new markets, a subject that has been only 
marginally discussed by International Business (IB). 
Recent interest in understanding the internationalization of DMNCs was motivated by a 
systemic change in global FDI flows. In 2010, developing and transition economies share of global 
FDI outflows increased to 28%, up from 15% in 2007 (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development [UNCTAD], 2011), while during the 1980’s DMNCs accounted only for shares between 
3 to 9.6 % of world outward FDI. Furthermore, DMNCs have special particularities that influence 
their international strategies. They are generally state-owned or recently privatized companies 
organized in business groups, which together accounted for a third of the emerging world’s foreign 
direct investment in the period of 2003-10, according to data from UNCTAD (2012); they have 
adopted distinctive approaches to internationalization (Goldstein, Bonaglia, & Mathews, 2006); and 
developed a symbiotic relationship with governments (Schneider & Soskice, 2009). Thus, FDI 
outflows from developing countries should be understood considering contextual factors such as high 
levels of government involvement, industry structures, ownership patterns, and business law 
enforcement (Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng, 2005).  
Despite the fact that the political environment is pointed out as a constrainer or supporter of 
DMNCs strategies, only anecdotal information exists about how, and through which mechanisms, the 
interaction between DMNCs and governments occurs. This paper fills this gap by providing an in-
depth analysis about the mechanisms of interaction between multinationals and home country 
governments based on evidence from Brazil, a democracy with a history of both developmental and 
liberal governments. First, it investigates the influence of the Brazilian government as a driver of the 
international expansion of domestic firms in both entry and consolidation phases in the foreign market. 
Second, our research focuses on the political component of multinational corporations’ (MNCs) 
strategies, incorporating firms as actors not only constrained by the political institutional environment, 
but also able to influence policy outcomes. Most IB studies take institutions for granted or only as 
constraint factors, focusing on how MNCs can mitigate political risk when host countries impose 
fiscal and regulatory reforms or restrictions to finance mechanisms (Henisz, 2000; Holburn & Zelner, 
2010). In fact, in developing countries, political activity is an alternative corporate strategy to 
overcome lack of market institutional support. While Corporate Political Activity (CPA) and IB 
streams together provide a broad perspective of international business-government interactions, there 
is a great need for a better integration of the two literatures (Blumentritt & Night, 2002). Studies about 
MNE-government relations tend to stand by themselves, without attempting to integrate explicitly into 
MNC theory (Boddewyn, 1988). 
To examine the mechanisms of DMNCs-government interaction we first present a brief review 
about the role assigned to home country governments on IB research and the literature about corporate 
political strategy. We also point to the relevance of industrial and foreign trade policies in shaping the 
importance that political connections have gained in the case of DMNCs. We then describe our 
research methodology, our study sample and our main findings, proposing constructs to classify 
DMNC–home country government mechanisms of interaction. Finally, we present our conclusion and 
discuss evidence that suggest an association between DMNCs political behavior and above average 
benefits from home country government.  
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DMNCs and the Role of the Home Country Government 
 
 
Governments meaningfully affect firms’ performance, operations and governance, and the 
market environment in which they compete (Marcus, Kaufman, & Beam, 1987) because of the way 
they distribute the burdens and benefits among firms. As Boddewyn (1988) stressed, non-market 
actors, such as governments, support market transactions through power and other noneconomic 
sanctions and, therefore, need to be accounted for in the IB perspective. Governments can subsidize 
financial resources, create and enforce jurisdiction on hostile acquisitions, release public tenders and 
own effective controlling interest in corporate entities, as in state-owned companies and sovereign 
funds, facilitate MNCs’ market access, dialogue with foreign governments and international 
organizations, and even impose barriers to the transfer of factors of production and ownership control. 
They are aware that through MNCs they develop the ability to connect the local economy to the 
outside world (Luo, 2004) and can implement public policies, such as industrial and foreign policy. 
In many emerging economies, globalization and an exogenous increase in the portion of the 
economy that was exposed to international competition have induced changes in economic preferences 
and market and political power reorganization. Although exogenous forces have spread market 
reforms and an increase in internationalization levels in many countries, policy outcomes can only be 
explained at a country specific level. This is because differences in actor’s preferences are not directly 
reflected as changes in domestic policies; they are mediated by institutions (Garret & Lange, 1995). 
Since it is our interest in this paper to understand domestic policies that support firm 
internationalization, it is necessary to look at both the political conflict shaped by the preferences of 
different actors, weighted by their market power and their propensity for collective action and the role 
of extant political and macroeconomic institutions of a country.   
Garret and Lange (1995) support that governments’ responsiveness to changes in domestic 
preferences will vary significantly according to institutional arrangements, considering regime type 
(how easy is to challenge the policies of the incumbent government), the level of government 
dependence on the core group that support the status quo, the number of veto points in the political 
system (inversely correlated) and the level to which authority over policy rests in the hands of 
independent bureaucratic agencies. 
One of the most interesting features that characterized the DMNC internationalization process is 
the involvement of developing country governments that support international activities of firms from 
their country (Sargent & Ghaddar, 2001). This involvement responds to historical paths that are not 
shared by their developed country counterparts. As presented by Gammeltoft, Pradhan, and Goldstein 
(2010) in the special issue of the Journal of International Management, in emerging economies. 
Central and local governments play a larger and more active role in the economy, and firms tend 
to be more attuned to government priorities and preferences. Government support also provides 
emerging economy firms with privileged access to certain inputs, preferential financing, 
subsidies and other support (p. 1).   
For instance, researchers divide the expansion of emerging multinationals into three different 
periods. In the first wave of internationalization, governments from emerging countries relied on 
import-substitution policies (Lall, 1983) and consequently stimulated production directed at the 
domestic market. The second wave, dominated by Asian firms, was defined by export-oriented 
industrialization, which targeted the creation of large players that could seek previously unavailable 
assets and markets, allowing local firms to build their international competitiveness (Rasiah, 
Gammeltoft, & Jiang, 2010). This second wave led to the growth of many of the central actors of the 
third wave of Internationalization, (Rasiah et al., 2010), which brought more market power (especially 
for firms trading in natural resources). 
The Role of Home Country Political Resources  419 
BAR, Rio de Janeiro, v. 10, n. 4, art. 3, pp. 415-438, Oct./Dec. 2013                 www.anpad.org.br/bar  
Industrial and trade policies were key drivers for the increase in OFDI coming from these 
nations (Rasiah et al., 2010). Governments had a special interest in capturing the benefits that can 
result from OFDI and in regulating the way in which these policies affected their internal positioning. 
This resulted in a number of protectionist policies in Asia and Latin America, that for the latter 
represented the surge of organized sectors of production safeguarded by tariff walls (Etzkowitz & 
Brisolla, 1999).    
In our view, the case of Brazil is representative of many emerging economies as it shares many 
of the steps that came into defining a policy agenda. Specifically Brazil places a lot of importance in 
its industrial policies as part of its effort to become a player in the international arena (1 & 5). The 
government has had an important involvement in the creation of policies that support sectors deemed 
strategic, such as the automotive and petrochemical industries (Shapiro, 1994) and currently holds an 
ownership position in many of the most internationalized DMNCs in the country (6).  
In reality, policy changes come as part of an effort to adapt emerging economies’ procedures 
and mechanisms of interaction with companies against those from developed countries, since DMNCs 
have unique characteristics and behaviors (Sargent & Ghaddar, 2001). DMNCs develop different 
competences in comparison to traditional MNCs, such as cost advantages and political competences, 
due to contextual characteristics like their history in unstable political and economic environments and 
less capital-intensive markets. Emerging economies suffered from a remarkable failure to build up 
firm-specific advantages to drive FDI and make it profitable (Murtha & Lenway, 1994). Local 
governments tend to engage and even coordinate regulatory and financing activities in order to 
compensate for the late mover position of DMNCs (Rasiah et al., 2010).  
Current literature covers only a few issues regarding home country government influence on 
DMNC internationalization. For example, DMNCs’ experience in turbulent political environments can 
have a positive effect on the development of political capabilities; i.e., organizational capabilities for 
assessing policy risk and managing the policy-making process, which can be transferred to operations 
in similar institutional environments and guarantee DMNCs a competitive advantage in comparison to 
MNCs from developed countries (Holburn & Zelner, 2010). The literature also suggests that FDI can 
be an escape response to home country factors such as high tax rates (Caves, 1996) and lack of 
institutional alignment with firm’s needs (Witt & Lewin, 2007).  
 
Multinational political activity 
 
The way in which governments and firms interact is one of the key components of MNC 
internationalization theories (Dunning, 1988). Since companies depend on governments to realize their 
profits, it is important that they be politically underwritten in a way that gives them a high degree of 
representation (Schneider & Soskice, 2009). Through political activity, companies seek to protect 
themselves from government opportunism (Henisz & Williamson, 1999), and to gain legitimacy and 
political rents resulting from government action as a regulator and factor of production. 
The growing entanglement of the public and private sectors has encouraged many corporations 
to reassess their existing methods for interacting with the government (Marcus et al., 1987). Hillman 
and Hitt (1999) developed a framework to account for businesses’ political strategic formulation. They 
argue that firms can employ information, financial incentives and constituency building strategies and 
this decision depends on the issue, its frequency and also on the political environment of the country in 
which the firm operates (Blumentritt & Night, 2002). There are different mechanisms available, 
including lobbying, public and government relations, alliances with other firms and bribery (Hillman 
& Hitt, 1999), which can be used individually or combined in order to exploit political rents and to 
raise the transaction costs for competing firms. 
One of the key decisions companies must make regarding their non-market strategies is related 
to collective versus individual action. Although individual undertaking may lead to superior returns in 
comparison to industry competitors, the initial decision of establishing a public affairs office and 
developing public affairs capability is costly and difficult to revoke (Blumentritt, 2003). According to 
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transaction cost theory, the coordination in the nonmarket environment will vary according to the 
frequency of dependencies and the types of human assets (specific/ nonspecific) (Ring & Van de Ven, 
1992). When firm and industry interests are congruent, investments in nonspecific human assets at the 
trade association level are likely to occur. However, interests within industries are often seriously 
divided and therefore groups cannot engage in frequent and effective collective action, forcing a firm 
to invest in specific human assets in order to develop political expertise or acquire it from a consulting 
firm. It is quite plausible that a single firm facing multiple issues of relevant government dependence 
will pursue each of these strategies simultaneously (Marcus et al., 1987). 
 
 
Research Methodology  
 
 
We conducted a qualitative analysis in order to uncover the mechanisms of interaction between 
governments and DMNCs and their effect on a firm’s international insertion. As a process data 
analysis, it provides means to conceptualize events and detect patterns among them (Langley, 1999), 
which can be later categorized and inspire propositions for future research. We chose Brazil, given that 
most of the country’s MNCs are leading companies in their sector (Fleury & Fleury, 2009), such as the 
animal protein industry. The case serves to describe the internationalization of DMNCs as it captures 
the behavior of companies that have followed similar internationalization paths to those signaled in the 
literature as traditional of emerging multinationals, such as being late movers and focusing on 
acquisition (Fleury & Fleury, 2011). 
Our research was built upon primary information gathered around two Brazilian MNCs, one a 
public investment agency and one a business association. We also collected secondary data, such as 
financial and industrial reports, economic indicators and case studies published from 1994 to 2011. 
Due to the sensitivity of political issues, the secondary data was an important source for understanding 
the phenomena studied and for making triangulations.  
The interviews were conducted from July to October 2011 and addressed not only the 
companies’ own experiences but also changes in industry and competition patterns. We selected two 
Brazilian MNCs from the animal protein sector listed in the Valor Multinational/Sobeet ranking for 
most internationalized companies in Brazil. This ranking, published by one of Brazil’s most respected 
business magazines, measures companies’ internationalization indices through the number of jobs, 
assets and revenue aboard. In 2010, firm 1 had net revenue around US$27.5 billion and a large public 
shareholder participation owned by a public bank. Firm 2 had net revenue of approximately US$12.5 
billion and is characterized by a good degree of maturity in operational performance, as well as stock 
ownership by state-owned pension funds.  
We interviewed directors, managers and analysts of the areas related to internationalization, 
institutional and investor relations. We used secondary information to formulate questions directly 
related to issues of internationalization, investments and public policies. In each interview, at least two 
researchers were present to take field notes. We recorded the interviews when allowed. Afterwards, we 
complemented our secondary data with information mentioned by our informants, such as foreign 
investments, political connections and financial loans. 
In order to allow a holistic view of the process we interviewed representatives from an industry 
federation and an investment promotion agency. Organization 3 is a private industry federation whose 
mission is to represent industrial interests in society, including in public spheres, by giving assistance 
on issues like advocacy, market intelligence, customs clearance and trade promotion. Organization 4 is 
a state investment promotion agency that aims to facilitate dialogue between business and foreign 
governments to attract foreign direct investment. We complemented interviews with data about public 
development banks loans, public agency mandates and industrial policy programs.   
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The data was collectively analyzed in group sessions in order to increase internal validity. These 
analysis sessions took place during the period from May 18 until November 24, 2011. The 
examination was conducted using simple categorical qualitative analysis through an inductive method. 
The construction of the final conceptual framework was devised as a functional model with data and 
extant literature integration. In order to further validate our model, we conducted a new data 
collection, essentially from secondary sources, in order to strengthen, refute and refine the framework 
developed and avoid mis-fitting data.  
As not all relevant information collected from interviewees and secondary sources could be 
included in our discussion, we have provided an additional annex (Annex A) at the end of this paper, 
in order to add more evidence on the mechanisms of political influence identified in the research.  
 
 
Discussion and Findings 
 
 
This section is divided in two subsections. The first section considers the influence of the 
Brazilian government in the internationalization process of Brazilian MNCs and describes ways of 
government’s influence considering the institutional channels of dialogue between firms and 
governments and their level of formality. The second section identifies political strategies used by 
Brazilian MNCs in their home country environment.  
 
Home country government’s influence on Brazilian MNCs 
 
Research connecting business and politics recognizes the role of the government as a regulator 
and factor of production (Boddewyn & Brewer 1994). They have the ability to alter firms’ size, market 
and cost structure and affect the demand for products and services (Hillman & Hitt, 1999). In order to 
do this, governments use many instruments, including but not limited to antitrust legislations, taxation, 
credit lines and direct purchase.  
The Brazilian government’s agenda shows a growing interest in national MNCs’ activities. 
Public policies directed to enhance Brazilian companies’ competitiveness and international expansion 
have been developed since the 1990’s. Although government’s role has changed in comparison to 
previous periods that were characterized by import-substitution industrialization policies, the 
government has kept its interventionist bent and maintains for itself the role of selecting and 
promoting strategic sectors, as indicated in the following excerpt from The Economist, (2010), 
In some cases the state actively promotes industrial concentration, to help firms gain the scale to 
compete abroad. In the 1990s a privatizing government got around the scarcity of capital and 
know-how by coaxing state-owned pension funds to co-operate with private companies, and 
pushed public banks into giving them subsidized loans. Today Brazil’s firms are stronger and its 
capital markets deeper. But the government continues to intervene. 
Government’s role is more evident in initial phases of the internationalization process, 
specifically during the entry phase in new markets. Even before the international expansion of 
Brazilian MNCs, the Brazilian government predisposed industry concentration in strategic sectors in 
order to build national champions able to compete with incumbent MNCs in the international market. 
With the rapid international expansion of Brazilian MNCs, government involvement during both the 
entry and expansion phases has increased.  
As noticed in our interviews, “governments are not unique and cohesive organizations; they 
have a series of internal disputes” (Organization 3, field note). This means that public policies can 
have mixed effects for Brazilian MNCs. But since internationalization promotion has reached 
consensus in the Brazilian public agenda, the government has recently created public and capital 
agencies that act as direct channels of interaction with MNCs and have the role to: (a) assign political 
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meaning to and consolidate unique visions for MNC demands before any of their negotiations with 
other governmental actors, where the dispute for public policies and public funds is more intense; and 
(b) make sure MNCs interests are represented in the three branches of government.  
Data analysis indicated that governments use a series of formal and informal reinforcement 
mechanisms to interact with MNCs, which were categorized as shown in Table 1. It also presents the 
constructs that we studied as a way of showing the cognitive process used to interpret and explain our 
main findings. Furthermore, it helps to establish linkages between empirical work and conceptual 
development. 
 
Table 1 
 
Evidence of Home Country Government Influence on National MNCs 
 
Constructs Evidences 
Supply of subsidized resources to 
internationalization 
MNCs’ material facts related to BNDE’s (Brazilian 
Development Bank) loans. 
BNDES’ loans to internationalization projects of Brazilian 
companies (BNDES website). 
Government’s shareholder participation Principal shareholders of Brazilian MNE outstanding common 
shares (company’s website). 
Articulation with foreign governments 
and international organizations 
“Conflicts involving Odebrecht, in Ecuador, and Petrobras, in 
Bolivia, in 2008, demanded that the Brazilian Foreign Ministry 
create a new Energy department” (Freitas, 2011). 
Favorable 
Regulation 
and 
Legislation 
Competition policy “In the 1990s a privatizing government got around the scarcity 
of capital and know-how by coaxing state-owned pension funds 
to cooperate with private companies, and pushed public banks 
into giving them subsidized loans. Today Brazil’s firms are 
stronger and its capital markets deeper. But the government 
continues to intervene.” (The Economist, 2010). 
Technical Regulation  
 
Thematic or industrial policy BNDES’s policies are aligned with the Brazilian Productive 
Development Policy (PDP), which has granted priority to 
internationalization projects of selected sectors, such as animal 
protein processing (O Estado de São Paulo, 2010a). 
Note. Source: elaborated by authors.  
 
Supply of subsidized resources for internationalization  
 
Public institutions are key financial resources for private companies in Brazil. This is likely 
explained by the lack of private bank involvement in long-term corporate bonds as well as by the 
developing state of the Brazilian stock market.  
Through O Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento (BNDES) and its commercial branch, 
BNDESPAR, the government increases the mechanisms and modalities of financing 
internationalization support, following the guidelines of industrial policy plans, such as the Brazilian 
Productive Development Policy (PDP), which has granted priority to internationalization projects of 
selected sectors like animal protein processing, as presented in Table 2. Interviewees from Firm 1 
pointed out that the proceedings to obtain BNDES’s loans started when the company outlined an 
aggressive international expansion plan, stressing that it would not be possible to obtain such 
resources on the market with similar conditions. Two Brazilian MNCs operating in the animal protein 
industry have occupied the top positions as BNDES’s loan receivers.  
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Table 2 
 
BNDES’s Loans to Largest Animal Protein Processing Brazilian MNCs 
 
Year Client Project Description Total (in BRL) 
2010 MARFRIG 
  
Support to subscription of convertible debentures. 2,500,000,000 
Financing for working capital  200,000,000 
2009 JBS S/A  Internationalization of local companies  3,479,600,000 
BRASIL 
FOODS  
Purchase of common stock, emission of BRF Brasil Foods S.A., 
previously Perdigão S.A., total amount of BRL$1 billion, in the 
scope of company’s initial public offering. 
750,000,000 
Bertin Financing for working capital, special credit program scope 200,000,000 
2008 Bertin Consolidation of the “Bertin’s internationalization program” 
through acquisition of new companies, as well as modernization 
and amplification of existing factories and implementation of 
new industrial unities. 
2.499.929.732 
JBS S/A Investments related to the company internationalization 
strategy. 
1,109,267,813 
MARFRIG Support to the company’s investment program through 
BNDESPAR private stock. 
700,000,000 
SADIA Addition of resources for implementation of its domestic 
Project, involving the construction of new poultry and swine 
slaughterhouses, a new feed factory and swine manufacturer 
unity, and the construction of a housing development for 
company employees. 
329,844,777 
PERDIGÃO Amplification and modernization of industrial unity, in order to 
increase slaughter capacity from 50 to 280 thousand poultry per 
Day.  
156,593,796 
Note. Source: elaborated by authors based on data from Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento. (n. d.). Consulta às operações 
do BNDES. Retrieved from 
http://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/bndes/bndes_pt/Institucional/BNDES_Transparente/Consulta_as_operacoes_do_BND
ES/ 
BNDES has a specific credit line to finance internationalization of companies with national 
control that aims to build new subsidiaries abroad, acquire or expand installed unities and raise its 
share participation. Since 2004, BNDES’ operations that aimed at internationalization have increased 
significantly, as showed by Table 3.  
 
Table 3  
 
BNDES – OPERATIONS AIMED at Internationalization (in millions of BRL) 
 
Period Qualifications Approvals Spending 
2004 3.70 - - 
2005 209.00 197.20 192.20 
2006 1,065.00 955.00 970.80 
2007 5,091.50 1,630.10 1,223.20 
Continues 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
Period Qualifications Approvals Spending 
2008 1,842.80 4,309.20 4,237.30 
2009 4,484.80 3,588.90 2,265.30 
2010 2,510.00 2,589.40 3,849.20 
Total 15,206.70 13.83 12,738.00 
Note. Source: AINT, DEINT, extracted from Valor Multinacionais Brasileiras. (2011, setembro). Valor Econômico, Ano 4 
(4). Retrieved from http://www.revistavalor.com.br/home.aspx?pub=3&edicao=4 
 
Government’s shareholder participation 
 
During the 1990s a series of privatizations and other liberal reforms undertaken in Brazil 
changed the ownership structure of domestic companies. Nonetheless, there are still important state-
owned Brazilian MNCs, like the giant oil manufacturer, Petrobras, and the biggest power utility in 
Latin America, Eletrobras. Another interesting example is Embraer, global leader of regional jets 
privatized in 1994, but still under government direct influence since the latter has kept a golden share 
right. Governments can also be shareholders of corporate entities, owning stakes of private and 
independent corporate entities. BNDESPAR and state-owned pension funds are the main Brazilian 
governmental branches of shareholder participation. In the end of 2011, BNDES had direct 
shareholder participation in 154 companies, concentrated in the oil and gas, mining, electricity, 
foodstuff, pulp and paper and telecommunication sectors (BNDES, 2011). Government decisions acts 
as a selective tool, choosing which sectors and firms receive government investment instead of relying 
on market mechanisms where companies can count on governments as a lender of last resort.  
Although government agencies are contingent to legal requirements and industrial policy 
guidelines, in Brazil there is still space to pick the winners. For example, in terms of shareholding, 
BNDES’ best practices indicate that the bank has to respect a 30% limit. An exception is allowed for 
infant and technology-based companies, where shareholder participation can achieve a 40% share. 
However, in JBS’s case, one of the largest Brazilian MNCs in the animal protein sector, BNDES’ 
stake rose from 17% to more than 30% in 2011. The additional financial support was granted in order 
to reduce uncertainties related to JBS Initial Public Offering (IPO) on the USA stock market, which 
was not realized. BNDES policy exemplifies a government’s influence on both entry and expansion 
phases of internationalization for Brazilian MNCs. 
 
Favorable regulation and legislation 
 
Governments have the opportunity to create, enforce and interpret the rules and norms that 
govern firms’ interactions with employees, suppliers, competitors and within the financial, vocational 
training and social security systems, among others. While the Legislative body proposes broad 
directives through laws, the execute branch enforces them through specific regulations and the 
judiciary interprets them and provides the mechanisms for dispute resolution. This means that the 
three branches of government may influence MNCs’ coordination. 
Studies in the matter have characterized the Brazilian government as a non-facilitator, erratic in 
the formulation of rules, weak and hostile for private companies (Pearce, 2001). Some of our 
interviewees corroborated this idea, indicating that there are major difficulties related to government 
influence on business in Brazil. Most complaints pointed out that bureaucracy, delay in conflict 
resolution and the complexity, contestability and lack of clarity of the tributary system represented 
serious burdens to local companies. These additional burdens made companies delay their 
internationalization process. However, since the 1990s the Brazilian government has been engaged in 
compensating internal additional costs to internationalization. It is interesting to note that the learning 
experience in the home country has influenced the types of competencies gained by Brazilian MNCs. 
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For example, they developed operational excellence and political capabilities to survive in times of 
high inflation and political turbulence. Brazilian MNCs are now characterized as flexible and able to 
rapidly adapt to external changes. 
Brazilian MNCs have a positive perception about governmental technical entities, responsible 
for issues like sanitary and external trade regulation. Government–MNC relations on such issues are 
mediated through established dialogue channels, making it easier for the firm to register new products 
or get permits for new plant factories, for example. In the case of animal protein processing firms, 
there is an open dialogue with the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture. This was considered really 
important for the researched MNE’s export activities since: “in order to supply international markets, 
companies have to comply with international sanitary requirements. Foreign missions can come to 
Brazil, or they can delegate the licensing process to Brazilian government” (Firm 2, field note). The 
Brazilian government has, according to them, the expertise to deal with such requirements. 
In addition, competition policy regulation in Brazil exemplifies how governments can reinforce 
their roles in picking the winners in the domestic context and build them to compete in international 
markets. The Economist (2010) provides evidence that support this idea:  
Antitrust policy has long been weak in Brazil. In the 1990s the country started opening its 
economy and privatizing firms in order to increase competition. But a study in 2007 by Edmund 
Amann of the University of Manchester and Werner Baer of the University of Illinois found that 
15 years later, the market share of the top four companies in most sectors had become even 
greater.  
Yet, recent changes in Brazil’s Council of Economic Defense (CADE, the national competitive 
authority with preventive, repressive and educational duties) may change this scenario. All major 
players in the Brazilian animal protein sector have been or are under investigation by the agency. It is 
worth noting that CADE can be characterized as an independent agency that can operate on politically 
sensitive cases far from government pressure (Drago & Nogueira, 2013).  
We can explain the prior experiences by utilizing the framework for the Brazilian Industrial 
Policy proposed by Hay (1999). In his work, Hay recognizes two types of policy that the government 
can create in order to deal with potential market failures: general industrial policies and sectorial or 
vertical policies. General industrial policies are related to creating appropriate models of competition 
while vertical policies are set to provide specific sectors with time to adjust to abrupt changes in 
market conditions that could affect issues of national interest, like technological development and 
employment (Hay, 1999). As shown before, our interviewees corroborated such ideas, pointing to their 
specific relationships with vertical entities (Ministry of Agriculture) and the challenges experienced 
from competition regulators including the CADE. This observation shows that companies are aware 
and respond differently to matters within the industrial policy level.  
 
Articulation with foreign governments and international organizations  
 
MNCs’ access and entrance to new foreign markets often demands interaction between home 
and host country governments. The Brazilian MNCs interviewed find that it is quite hard to start a 
dialogue with foreign governments without the support of home country institutions. Moreover, as 
pointed out by previous research, MNC bargaining power decreases once FDI has been committed 
(Henisz & Zelner, 2005). Thus, home country government support seems to also assist Brazilian 
MNCs’ international strategies after they are established in a foreign country. 
Evidence about the articulation between home and host country governments indicates the 
adoption of different and complementary mechanisms, mainly through Ministries and investment 
promotion agencies (even if they have a mixed capital ownership structure). One example presented in 
our field notes stresses the Brazilian government role in accessing the Japanese swine market. 
Brazilian exporters faced sanitary barriers that were often alleged to be technical barriers. To 
overcome them, companies looked for government diplomacy assistance. The Brazilian government 
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organized bilateral trade missions, generally involving members of the Ministry of External Relations, 
Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade, and Ministry of Agriculture, aiming to 
negotiate with their counterparts, exchange information and conduct technical visits.  
Besides opening markets abroad, home country governments can communicate with foreign 
governments and other host country’s stakeholders in order to solve MNCs conflicts, similar to what 
has occurred with Odebrecht, in Ecuador, and Petrobras, in Bolivia, in 2008. Struggles with foreign 
stakeholders led to the creation of a new energy department inside the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, capable of dealing with the specificity of these episodes (Freitas, 2011). 
 
Synthesis of government influence mechanisms  
 
According to our research, home country governments adopt a series of mechanisms to 
encourage flows and maintenance of outward FDI, either by conceding direct benefits to MNCs in 
comparison to other firms or by reducing barriers created by other actors. It is important to notice that 
not all forms of influence are converted into MNCs’ benefits, as governments have to respond to 
demands from different actors in society with divergent interests. 
Governments have formal and informal mechanisms to influence MNCs. Formal mechanisms 
are those expressed in norms and rules, codified public policies, public structures and support 
apparatus. Examples of formal mechanisms include regulations about limits on ownership, control and 
cross-border transfers of production factors by an MNE, or competitive policies released by federal 
government, which draws actions involving several governmental entities with the purpose of 
stimulating a greater engagement of companies into internationalization. 
However, formal mechanisms are often weak and can be replaced by more fluid and 
individualistic interactions (Schneider & Soskice, 2009). This is consistent with the evidence found 
concerning the Brazilian environment. Informal mechanisms are based on personal networks and 
rooted in socially accepted behavioral patterns, such as paternalism and corruption. They are often 
used by governments to reach specific goals, for instance to select strategic sectors and actors on the 
domestic market in order to create “national champions”.  
In addition, evidence collected suggests that a significant part of foreign trade and investment 
issues are treated at the federal government level. We have identified entities that supply direct 
channels of dialogue with MNCs, such as commerce related ministries, the development public bank 
BNDES, and traditional legislative instances. Autonomous agencies, like the Brazilian Trade and 
Investment Promotion Agency (Apex-Brasil), BNDESPAR (BNDES’ commercial branch), state-
owned companies and pension funds are indirect channels that intermediate government dialogue with 
Brazilian MNCs.  
Table 4 classifies the ways governments influence national MNCs according to types of 
mechanisms (formal and informal) and channels of action used by governments to operationalize their 
influence.  
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Table 4 
 
Mechanisms of Government’s Influence on National MNCs and Channels of Actions 
 
  Action 
  Direct Indirect 
M
ec
h
a
n
is
m
s 
Formal 
Traditional mechanisms of governmental 
influence through the Executive, Legislative 
and Judiciary branches. 
Mechanisms created by governments that 
allow better adaptation for formal dialogue 
with the private sector. 
Example. Articulation with foreign 
governments; supply of resources for 
internationalization. 
Example: articulation with foreign 
governments and government shareholder 
participation.  
Informal 
Invisible mechanisms mediated by personal 
networks and informal institutions that 
penetrate the public sphere. 
Invisible mechanisms, implemented through 
personal networks with local and foreign 
decision-makers  
Ex.: selection of national champions and 
corruption. 
Ex.: articulation with foreign governments 
based on personal contacts 
Note. Source: Elaborated by authors. 
 
Political strategies 
 
Public policies and the political decision-making process, whether at the district, state or federal 
level, affect the relative costs involved in a company’s international expansion. Thus, the political 
environment is a key component for MNCs’ strategies. As described below, we identified five political 
strategies that Brazilian MNCs use in order to access governmental bodies and represent their interests 
in the public sphere. 
 
Financial donations to political parties 
 
In Brazil, financial donations are a political strategy that directly links DCMC’s to individual 
politicians or political parties. While candidates and political parties need funds to strengthen their 
campaigns and increase their chances for election, companies seek to support candidates with a high 
probability of election in order to have their industries well-represented in the public agenda.  
Deciding who to support and transfer resources to their campaigns is a strategic decision for 
MNCs and can define how government relations will be managed in the years after the election. 
Evidence suggests that Brazilian MNCs invest in candidates according to their sectorial agenda rather 
than their left-right spectrum. For example, a respondent from Firm 2 stated that “to support the 
elections, we don’t look at the party, we look at people linked to the agribusiness sector who advocate 
for the sector, if we have a candidate more sensitive to the agribusiness cause, we will support him or 
her” (Firm 2, field note). When supported candidates are elected, companies’ ability to influence 
thematic public policies in the next mandate increases. It may also help companies to make their 
interests represented in the broader industrial policy agenda, which may be reflected in better official 
loans conditions, such as those from BNDES. 
Most of Brazilian MNCs operating in the animal protein-processing sector have made legal 
political donations. According to data from the Brazilian Superior Electoral Court (TSE), JBS has 
donated over US$6 million to candidates and political parties from 2006 to 2010, and has been one of 
the largest donors to the Workers Party (PT), the current ruling party (Transparência Brasil, 2010). In 
2006, 18 supported deputies were elected, the majority from the mid-west region. In 2010, 39 
parliamentarians were supported from 15 states.  
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Table 5 shows evidence that suggests that Brazilian companies with higher levels of 
internationalization are amongst the major donors during Brazilian elections. From the top 10 
companies that have donated more money to the winning presidential candidate in 2010 elections, 7 
were Brazilian MNCs and 5 of them were listed among the ranking of Valor Multinacionais 
Brasileiras (2011), accounting for 28.72% of total donations. Their industries also benefited from 
federal government programs such as the Growth Acceleration Program (Programa de Aceleração do 
Crescimento [PAC]). Inside the PAC, the Family Allowance program increased food intake and sugar 
consumption, and the program My Home, My Life boosted the market for real estate developers.  
 
Table 5 
 
Companies’ Donations for Winning Candidate Campaign, Presidential Elections 2010 
 
Rank Donator Industry Internationalization 
Ranking 2011 
Total Weight 
1 JBS S/A foodstuffs 1 R$ 8,049,120.13 7.19% 
2 Camargo Corrêa  conglomarate 18 R$ 7,601,946.79 6.79% 
3 Andrade Gutierrez construction and engineering 6 R$ 4,561,168.07 4.07% 
4 Itau Unibanco finance 35 R$ 4,000,000.00 3.57% 
6 Cosan sugar and ethanol - R$ 3,264,365.38 2.91% 
7 Construtora OAS construction and engineering 23 R$ 2,683,040.04 2.40% 
9 ARG construction and engineering - R$ 2,000,000.00 1.79% 
   Total R$ 32,159,640.41 28.72% 
Note. Source: Elaborated by authors based on Transparência Brasil. (2008, outubro). Quem financia quem nas eleições. 
Doadores a candidatos [Ás Claras]. Retrieved from http://www.asclaras.org.br/@index.php?ano=2008; Transparência Brasil. 
(2010, outubro). Quem financia quem nas eleições. Doadores a candidatos [Ás Claras]. Retrieved from 
http://www.asclaras.org.br/@index.php?ano=2010; O Estado de São Paulo. (2010b, dezembro 1). Veja o ranking das 220 
empresas que mais doaram para a campanha de Dilma. Política. Retrieved from http://blogs.estadao.com.br/vox-
publica/2010/12/01/veja-o-ranking-das-220-empresas-que-mais-contribuiram-para-a-campanha-de-dilma; Toledo, J. R. 
(2010). Veja o ranking das 220 empresas que mais doaram para a campanha de Dilma [Web log post]. Retrieved from 
http://blogs.estadao.com.br/vox-publica/2010/12/01/veja-o-ranking-das-220-empresas-que-mais-contribuiram-para-a-
campanha-de-dilma 
Donations can also occur after the election. For example, the President of the National Finance 
Committee of the Workers Party received donations from 46 companies for amounts greater than 
US$6 million after the campaign. According to the newspaper O Estado de São Paulo (2010a) the 
sugarcane industry made the biggest donation to help close the debits of Dilma Rousseff’s campaign 
after the election. Cosan, the largest in the industry, made a donation of US$3.5 million, while the 
Amaggi Group contributed with US$1 million. The Brazilian sugarcane and alcohol industry is closely 
monitoring government negotiations to increase access to US market. 
 
Personal connections 
 
Brazilian business–government history of entanglement had its first milestone in 1930, when 
entrepreneurs eventually incorporated into the coalition to support President Getulio Vargas. This pact 
was quintessential to lead to the transition from agro-export economy to the urban-industrial society 
(Diniz, 2010). Since then industrial entrepreneurs and public bureaucracy have been central actors in 
Brazilian political pacts (Bresser-Pereira, 2009). 
Personal connections in Brazil are powerful mechanisms to influence government decision 
makers. Although economic development and democracy reforms have made the interaction process 
more transparent, there is still huge influence from paternalism, nepotism, patronage and other 
informal mechanisms. For example, in the agriculture sector, Brazilian MNCs, such as producers of 
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fruit juice and alcohol/ sugar cane, historically have close relationships that facilitate access to 
authorities. This is an individual informal strategy that is difficult to copy and with potentially high 
returns. 
 
Personal service 
 
DCMC’s can establish links to governments when a firm representative serves in a political 
capacity. In Brazil, that was a usual strategy during President Lula’s administration (2002 to 2010). 
Examples include vice president José Alencar, shareholder of Coteminas, one of the largest textile 
groups in the country, Roberto Rodrigues, previous president of ABAG (the Brazilian Agribusiness 
Association), as Minister of Agriculture, and Luiz Fernando Furlan, chairman of the board of Sadia, 
now BR Foods, a large Brazilian group manufacturer and exporter of food, who was indicated for the 
Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade. An iconic case in Brazil is Jorge Gerdau, 
founding of Gerdau group, one of the largest business groups in the Brazilian steel industry, which 
operates in over 14 countries and has revenues of more than US$15 billion. Since May of 2011, 
Gerdau is the chairman of the Brazilian Chamber of Management Policy, Performance and 
Competitiveness, which is responsible for advising government on policies to improve 
competitiveness. Over 200 entrepreneurs and executives sponsor the project, including Carlos Alberto 
Sicupira, a partner at AB Inbev, Pedro Passos, partner and director of Natura, and David Feffer, 
chairman of Suzano Holding (Valor Multinacionais Brasileiras, 2011). 
Businessman may also serve in a political capacity by affiliating with political parties and 
running for elections. For example, Jose Batista Junior, the founder of JBS, has joined the PSB (Social 
Party of Brazil) to increase JBS political participation in the State of Goiás and facilitate a future 
application for governor. Goiás is JBS’s home state.  
 
Boards composed of ex-politicians and former officials from state enterprises 
 
Hillman (2005) asserts that one way to link a firm with the government is by appointing ex-
politicians to the board of directors. Analyzing the composition of board of directors from large 
Brazilian DCMC’s in sectors such as agribusiness, construction and pulp and paper, we found the 
names of career employees from BNDES, ministers and officials with experience in pension funds and 
public companies. Usually, they are invited to join the board as independent advisors and get involved 
with the company’s strategy. Our interviewees asserted that board members linked to the government 
are considered very influential because of their know-how in dealing with public sectors. This political 
strategy can also be used to complement and reinforce other strategies, since former officials have a 
better understanding of public procedures and have developed personal connections with current 
officials.  
 
Industry associations 
 
One of the main roles of an industry association is to represent and defend industry demands 
within the government with greater bargaining power, since it accounts for a high level of 
employability and a large slice of the country’s income. Associations get involved in activities like 
discussing changes in legislations, requesting support related to foreign markets access, advocating for 
preferential tax rates, double taxation agreements, price controls, customs control and procedures 
related to foreign trade. Moreover, they can also act as arbitrators, mediating differences and creating 
convergence within the industry, so that the industry position is cohesive before drawing the attention 
of authorities responsible for public policy processes.  
Companies can resort to associations as a collective political strategy. They are less expensive 
and risky than individual political strategies, however benefits awarded may be distributed to all 
members or even free riders. In order to obtain superior returns, firms can combine their political 
strategies with market strategies. For example, firm 2 has resorted to an association as a way to speak 
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with the home country government and ask it to facilitate access to the Japanese market. At the same 
time it started a dialogue with potential suppliers and distributors in Japan to secure exclusivity and 
create entrance barriers against other Brazilian competitors.  
Associations are a place to monitor competitors and to meet goals through joint action. 
Choosing the meat sector as a priority in the Policy for Productive Development, towards its 
consolidation and its internationalization, indicates the strength of this industry association and the 
benefits it may bring to its associates. After all, even if entrepreneurs have direct access to the 
authorities through personal connections, many situations can only be heard and discussed when 
articulated by industry representatives. A good example is the work conducted by the Brazilian Union 
of Sugar Cane Industry (UNICA) that has signed a provisional measure in December 2011 to stimulate 
ethanol storage domestically and avoid price fluctuation in harvests of sugar cane. The text of this 
provisional measure provides producers with federal funding at lower interest rates than the market so 
that they can build buffer stocks. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
This study works towards a better recognition of the political aspects in DMNCs’ entry and 
expansion phases in international markets. We focus on the understanding of the mechanisms 
governments use to foster the internationalization process of national firms and how DMNCs have 
overcome barriers to compete internationally by nurturing strong ties with home country governments. 
Internationalization affects the opportunities and constraints facing social and economic actors, and 
therefore their policy preferences (Milner & Keohane, 1996). We considered firms and governments 
as bounded rational actors that engage in political dialogue to pursue rent-seeking or businessman self-
interests, on one side, and development goals or politicians’ and bureaucrats’ self-interests, on the 
other. 
Since the 1990s, an exogenous easing of international exchange have induced reforms in Brazil 
towards a political economy in which private enterprise, including foreign investment, assumes 
expanded responsibility for economic development (Onis, 2000). We analyzed the Brazilian 
government’s role in promoting and securing OFDI during DCMCs’ first time as global players, a role 
that can be compared to American, European and Japanese governments during the first and second 
wave of internationalization. The policy mechanisms that enhance domestic firms’ international 
insertion are not exclusive to developed or developing countries, but they can be better investigated 
considering country specific variable, taking into account both demand (actors’ preferences, weighted 
by their market power and their propensity for collective action) and supply side (political institutions, 
politicians’ interests and prevailing ideas in a society) for public policies. Future research can also 
engage in comparative analysis between home country government mechanisms from developed and 
developing countries today. In fact, the US government has played a continuous role in large MNCs’ 
recoveries during the financial crisis.  
Our goal in this work was to pay attention to the combination of mechanisms from both 
Brazilian domestic and foreign policy that influence Brazilian DMNCs internationalization. Although 
this study shows evidence that could easily relate to other emerging economies, any potential 
generalization should take into account the specific trajectory that has led Brazil to its actual state. For 
instance, the large presence of natural resources, its recent military regime, and its longer 
industrialization experience (when compared to its Asian counterparts) may suggest that there are 
specific mechanisms that are unique to the nation (Etzkowitz & Brisolla, 1999). However, key 
similarities in industrial, trade and commercial policies including interventionism, protectionism and 
the selection of niche growth areas (such as chaebols or national champions) suggests that 
governments in emerging economies play a unique role in shaping the international faith of its national 
competitors (Rasiah et al., 2010). 
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Political institutions reflect domestic actor’s policy preferences, since they are intentionally 
created to guarantee the pursuit of particular policies (Milner & Keohane, 1996). The convergence of 
preferences between Brazilian political and economic actors towards an increase in their international 
insertion has led to public policies that aim to benefit Brazilian MNCs and to corporate political 
activity that aims to extract above-average returns from them. The case shows the relevance of 
context-specific analysis in understanding MNC strategies based on an environment that differs from 
most CPA literature, which has focused on two-party systems, checks and balances and regulated 
lobbying. Instead, Brazil is a multi-party system with the prevalence of policy networks, defined as 
systems of informal relationships between rational individuals that create a stable infrastructure for the 
exchange of personal favors (Verdier, 1995).  
Our findings suggest that although Brazilian companies’ decisions to internationalize are mainly 
influenced by factors in the market environment, the home country political environment is a key 
element of DMNCs’ strategies to access resources that drive FDI and the internationalization path of 
companies. Home country governments can support companies both in entry phases and after they 
have been established in foreign markets. Brazilian national champions exemplify the type of 
DMNCs that have pursued political and market strategies that enable them to catch-up with 
established internationals players and have access to significant incentives from the Brazilian 
government, such as subsided capital, facilitated dialogue with foreign governments and favorable 
competition policies.  
We argue that there is an association between MNCs’ political activity and the access to higher 
political benefits in the home-country political environment. Firms may perceive high returns potential 
in engaging in the policymaking process, especially in priority issues for the government, such as its 
global economic presence. We suggest that further research should incorporate evidence from other 
develop and developing firms in order to address two additional questions; determine the extent to 
which the choice, application and results from political strategies are different between developed and 
developing firms; to question the historical, social and cultural traits that affect the availability of 
political connections and the extent to which formal or informal ones are implemented. We would 
expect future studies to incorporate quantitative information as well as to use appropriate designs in 
order to isolate the causality direction of political activity.  
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ANNEX A 
 
 
Evidences  
 
Evidence Source Type 
“The motivation for our 
international expansion came, 
amongst other factors, from our 
industry, which is at a favorable 
moment in the country”  
*Interview with the Director of the 
company A (translation produced by 
authors) 
Favorable Regulation and 
Legislation 
“As resources to help our 
internationalization, JBS sought out 
capital from an IPO as well as 
Bandespar” 
*Interview with the Director of the 
company A (translation produced by 
authors) 
Personal Connection 
“In the case of BNDES the bank 
was oriented to support acquisitions 
abroad”  
*Interview with the Director of the 
company A (translation produced by 
authors) 
Supply of subsidized resources for 
internationalization 
“For our merger with Bertim & 
Pilgrim´s Pride the combined 
operation had a contribution from 
BNDES of about US$2 billion”  
*Interview with the Director of the 
company A (translation produced by 
authors) 
Personal Connections : Supply of 
subsidized resources for 
internationalization 
“Without the contribution from 
BNDES this transaction would have 
not been possible, or would have 
been slower”  
*Interview with the Director of the 
company A (translation produced by 
authors) 
Supply of subsidized resources for 
internationalization 
In terms of the Policy for Productive 
Development (PDP in Portuguese) 
BNDES chose the meat sector as a 
priority for the consolidation and 
internationalization processes 
BNDES (2009a) Industry Association 
BNDESPAR will provide 
guarantees for a 100% of bonds 
issued by JBS, exchangeable into 
Brazilian Depositary Receipts of 
JBS in the USA or alternatively 
exchangeable into JBS shares in 
case JBS USA decides not to open 
its capital. This should occur by 
December 31, 2010 
BNDES (2009b) Personal Connection: Supply of 
subsidized resources for 
internationalization 
Given the fact that the IPO did not 
go through, BNDES converts all 
bonds for shares in JBS Brazil, with 
its participation going from 17% to 
31% 
Freitas (2011) Personal Connection to 
Government’s shareholder 
participation 
JBS Board - Until August 2012: 
Marcus Vinicius Pratini de Moraes 
(Minister, founder of FUNCEX, 
member of the Advisory Board at 
BM&F, president of ABIEC); Peter 
Dvorsak (BNDES, BNDESPAR); 
Umberto Conti (FUNCEF, Special 
Advisor to the President) 
JBS (n. d.) Board composed of ex-politicians 
and former officials from state 
enterprises 
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Membership in associations: 
ABRAFRIGO – associação 
brasileira de frigoríficos; ABIEC – 
associação brasileira de industries 
exportadoras de carne (the President 
is the director of business strategy 
for JBS, Antônio Jorge Camardelli) 
Associação Brasileira das Indústrias 
Exportadoras de Carnes (2012)  
Industry Association / Personal 
Connection 
JBS was the largest single donor to 
Dilma’s 2010 Presidential campaign 
Transparência Brasil. (2008, 2010) Financial Donations to political 
parties 
(INTERVIEWER) “The difference 
in the organizational structure of 
JBS in Brazil and the US responds 
to differences in the ways in which 
government relations are 
implemented in both countries?”  
(INTERVIEWEE) “Yes, although 
we know that everyone does 
lobbying in Brazil”  
*Interview with the Director of the 
company A (translation produced by 
authors) 
Personal Connection 
Note. *company A is a fictitious name. Company A was interviewed by the authors in August, 2011. 
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ANNEX B 
 
 
Outward FDI Projects by State-owned TNCs, by Home Region/Economy, 2003-2010 
 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Developed countries  34 414  48 570  55 342  55 168  85 881  98 137  84 937  56 051 
Developing countries  36 895  43 021  45 535  101 965  91 100  111 606  74 254  85 698 
China  11 462  5 592  8 193  16 767  21 267  32 492  28 613  38 899 
Malaysia  4 930  1 432  2 572  2 050  4 288  4 813  2 854  19 811 
Brazil  5 344  1 085  2 391  1 740  2 501  9 592  2 381  5 808 
United Arab Emirates   447   258  17 520  45 516  27 108  28 297  20 470  5 713 
Korea, Republic of   904  1 444  2 055   86  1 095  2 800  4 353  3 734 
South Africa  2 135  15 352  1 174   446  1 358  2 166  2 323  2 225 
Singapore  2 196  4 609  2 689  6 309  6 574  2 724  1 191  1 739 
Kuwait  1 023  1 346   735  10 071  4 109  4 501   286  1 263 
Colombia - - -   536   340 - -  1 197 
Qatar -   264   236   53  5 265  5 331  4 943  1 063 
Venezuela  2 257   48   171   897   627  1 501   374   780 
Bahrain   5   2   2   415   162   422   28   745 
Angola - - - -   24 - -   493 
India  2 842  6 002  3 654  13 905  1 096  4 529  5 174   487 
Saudi Arabia   146  5 071   178  1 733  12 831  7 309   58   473 
Note. The data include major SOE investors. FDI projects include both cross-border M&As and greenfield FDI projects. 
Countries associated with indirect investments by third-parties have been removed. Source: United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development. (2011). World investment report 2011. Non-equity modes of international production and 
development (pp. 2-16). Retrieved from http://www.unctad-docs.org/files/UNCTAD-WIR2011-Full-en.pdf; United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development. (2012). World investment report 2012. Towards a new generation of investment 
policies (pp. 2-16). Retrieved from http://www.unctad-docs.org/files/UNCTAD-WIR2012-Full-en.pdf 
